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HOW FAR TO EXTEND PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY CLAUSE
OF COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT OF 1954
Claim of Albertson, Matter of Communist Party
8 N.Y.2d 77, 168 N.E.2d 242 (1960)1
Albertson brought this proceeding to recover unemployment com-
pensation under the New York Unemployment. Insurance Law.2 He was
employed for part of his base period with Communist organizations, which
employment was essential to qualify him for unemployment benefits.3 The
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied the benefits to him on the
ground that the Communist organizations for whom he worked could not
be considered contributing employers under the New York Unemployment
Insurance Law in light of section 3 of the Communist Control Act of 1954.1
This determination was reversed by the supreme court, appellate division,
and remitted to the Appeal Board for further proceedings; Albertson ap-
pealed directly to the court of appeals which held that he was entitled to
the benefits because his employment with the Communist Party had
terminated before it was removed from the list of contributing employers
under the New York Unemployment Insurance Law. More importantly,
in deciding the second issue before the court, it was held that as a result of
the Communist Control Act of 1954, the Communist Party is not entitled
to be recognized as an employer under the Unemployment Insurance Act of
New York, and is not entitled to registration on the official roll of employers.
The court interpreted status and enrollment of an employer as a right denied
the Communist Party by the act of 1954.
Section 3 of the Communist Control Act of 1954 reads in part:
The Communist Party . .. [is] not entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under
the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political
subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities
which have heretofore been granted to said party of any subsidiary
organization by reason of the laws of the United States or any
political subdivision thereof are hereby terminated.5
The important determination is whether Congress intended this section of the
act to preclude the Communist Party from qualifying as contributors to
joint federal-state unemployment compensation funds, thereby denying its
1 Cert. granted, 29 U.S.L. Week 3180 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1960) (No. 495).
2 N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 500-640.
3 The New York Unemployment Insurance Law does not exclude the Communist
Party as a possible employer under the law. However, it has been stated in an opinion
that since the Communist Party is a conspiracy against our Government, it should not
be permitted to participate in the unemployment insurance program operated by the
Government of the United States and the state of New York. Op. Atty. Gen. of N.Y. 239
(1957).
4 Communist Control Act § 3, 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1958).
5 Ibid.
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employees unemployment benefits. The solution to this problem turns on the
consideration of whether or not the payment of the tax is a right, privilege,
or immunity within the meaning of the Communist Control Act. The legisla-
tive history of the act is virtually silent as to how Congress intended the
privileges and immunities clause to be interpreted. From the finding of fact
by Congress that the party should be "outlawed, ' 6 it would seem that it was
trying to enact as broad a deprivation as possible. Perhaps this is why there
was so little debate about the specific rights, privileges, and immunities
encompassed by the act. There was some mention that section 3 would deny
the right of the party to be on the ballot 7 and a subsequent case has confirmed
this position.8 There was also some talk of a denial of the right to sue and
the right to enter into contracts,9 but outside of these areas, the discussion of
section 3 was very general in nature. This lack of specificity in the legislative
history of the act may account for the formal manner in which the court has
approached the instant case.
The majority of the court felt that status as an employer is a right
denied by the act whereas the dissent felt that contributing to the unemploy-
ment insurance fund was not a right but a liability and thus not encompassed
by the act at all. The approach of both the majority and the dissent seems
rather formalistic in that both base their judgments on whether taxation, in
the abstract sense, is to be considered a right, privilege, or immunity without
placing enough emphasis on the underlying purposes of the Communist
Control Act and the considerations necessitating its passage. If one is
prepared to concede that a contribution to an unemployment fund is a
tax,10 then, in the abstract sense it looks more like a liability than a right,
as taxation in all forms has traditionally been considered a burden or lia-
bility."
This approach, however, does not get to the heart of the problem. To
determine whether the statute should apply to the situation in this case
-whether the decision in this case furthers the purpose of the statute-one
must examine the reasons for the passage of the statute. It must also be kept
0 Communist Control Act § 2, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
7 100 Cong. Rec. 14713 (1954).
8 United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820 (D. Conn. 1955).
9 Supra note 7.
10 See Waterbury Say. Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 20 A.2d 455 (1941) which is
one of the many cases holding that payment of a contribution under an unemployment
compensation act is a tax.
11 See Phoenix Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. State of Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174 (1896),
a case involving a charter which granted all the rights, privileges, and immunities of one
insurance company to its successor. The issue in the case was whether these words could
be interpreted as a transfer of a current exemption from taxation and the court held that
the words were full and ample to grant such an exemption. See also Buchanan v. Knox-
ville and O.R.R., 71 Fed. 324 (6th Cir. 1896) which held that the term immunity was
an apt one to describe the right of a railroad to succeed to an exemption from taxation
enjoyed by its predecessor. In In re Cassaretakis, 289 N.Y. 119, 127, 44 N.E.2d 391, 394
(1942) paying money into the New York unemployment fund was termed an "obliga-
tion" or a "duty."
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in mind that the activities of the Communist Party have been continually
restricted, particularly in the last twenty years, so that recognition of any
sort, even if it entails payment of a tax, may be considered by the Party
itself to be a right, privilege, or immunity within the meaning of the act. An
early attempt by Congress to control Communist influence in this country
resulted in the Smith Act of 1940,12 which prohibits both advocacy of the
overthrow of the government by force and violence, and knowing membership
in any group which so advocates. In 1950 the Internal Security Act,13 aimed
more directly at Communist organizations, was passed; this act distinguishes
Communist front organizations from Communist action organizations, but
still requires both to register and file annual reports with the Attorney
General giving complete details as to their officers and funds. The next effort
of Congress to deal with the Communist Party was the Communist Control
Act of 1954, which was an outgrowth of two bills, both proposed amend-
ments to the Internal Security Act of 1950. The first bill added the category
of Communist-infiltrated organizations to the aforementioned Communist
front and Communist action organizations. 14 This new category was especially
designed to prevent infiltration by Communists into labor unions and to
remove them from positions of leadership in the unions. The other bill made
it a crime to be a member of the Communist Party, punishable by a $10,000
fine and up to five years imprisonment.15 The House amended this bill to read
that "the Communist Party is deprived of all the rights, privileges, and
immunities which have heretofore been granted the Party."'16 The criminal
provisions of the bill were altered by the conference committee so that the
punishment provided by the Internal Security Act of 1950 would be applicable
also to the Communist infiltrated organizations. 17 These acts illustrate a
general Congressional policy of suppression of the freedom of operation of
the Communist Party in the United States. Although one of the reasons for
passage of this act was to prevent Communist infiltration in labor unions,
a particularly prevalent evil at that time,'8 the act also embodies a more
general policy against Communist influence in all areas. This policy is made
most apparent by Congress' justification of the act by its finding that the
party's existence presents "a clear, present and continuing danger to the
security of the United States" and that it "should be outlawed."'19
The question then is whether prohibiting the Communist Party from
being an employer under the New York Unemployment Insurance Law
12 Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940).
13 Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1958).
14 S. 3706, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). This bill was enacted into law as § 7 of the
Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1958).
15 For the text of the original amendment, see 100 Cong. Rec. 14722 (1954).
16 H.R. 9838, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). This amendment now constitutes § 3 of the
Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 842 (1958).
17 The provision, as amended, became § 4 of the Communist Control Act, 68 Stat.
776 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 843 (1958).
18 See 100 Cong. Rec. 14099 (1954).
19 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 841 (1958).
[Vol. 22
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
furthers the underlying purpose of the Communist Control Act of curtailing
activities of the Party throughout the United States. It seems that granting
the Party any status whatsoever frustrates the apparent intentions of
Congress. The instant decision tends to make employment with the Com-
munist Party less attractive in that it is unable to offer unemployment
insurance benefits to its employees. This in turn diminishes one lucrative
source for recruitment of active party members and makes it more difficult
for the Party to hire employees of any type. If the act was intended to put
the Communist Party "outside the pale of the law," as Senator Ferguson
suggested,20 it should have been worded in more unqualified terms.21 It
cannot be denied, however, that the act and the circumstances surrounding
its passage, clearly evince a desire on the part of the legislature to inhibit
the activity of the Communist Party in this country, and since this decision
furthers that purpose, it should be upheld as a correct application of the
act.
20 100 Cong. Rec. 14719 (1954), "What the bill really does is put the Communist
Party, which is a conspiracy, outside the pale of the law, where it should be."
21 Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 6889-3A (Supp. 1954). State statutes attempting
to legislate the Communist Party out of existence have been much more specific. This
unequivocal Texas statute reads in part: "It shall be unlawful for [the Communist]
Party ... to exist, function, or operate in the state of Texas .... All funds, records, and
other property belonging to such Party . . . shall be seized by and forfeited to the State
of Texas, to escheat to the State as in the case of a person dying without heirs."
1961]

